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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
recognized in its 2007 report that “[w]arming of the climate 
system is unequivocal”1 and that “most of the observed increase 
in global average temperatures since the mid-20
th
 century is very 
likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG 
[greenhouse gas] concentrations.”2  While the exact rate and 
                                                          
* The original version of this article was presented at the Michigan State 
International Law Review Annual Symposium, “Battle for the North: Is All 
Quiet on the Arctic Front?,” February 21-22, 2013.  The author would like to 
thank the organizers for inviting her to the symposium and the editors of the 
Law Review for their assistance. 
** Associate Director, Global Legal Studies Center, UW Law School, 
USA and Lead Counsel, Human Rights, Center for International Sustainable 
Development Law, Montreal, Canada. 
1 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 2 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC report], available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. 
2 Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). 
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pace of climate change is uncertain, the phenomenon itself is no 
longer in doubt.
3
  Never before have we witnessed such extreme 
weather events, increased temperatures, melting glaciers and the 
resultant consequences on human beings. 
The IPCC Report identified that some systems, sectors, and 
regions will be especially affected by climate change: the Arctic 
is among the most vulnerable “because of the impacts of high 
rates of projected warming on natural systems and human 
communities.”4  The Antarctic has a sophisticated network of 
treaties protecting its fragile environment,
5
 but the Arctic is 
governed mainly by soft law instruments and  the domestic laws 
of the Arctic states.  The cornerstone of international law is the 
principle of sovereignty; however, international law does 
recognize areas that are outside the sovereignty of states, called 
the global commons. These comprise the high seas, outer space 
and the Antarctica.
6
  Should the Arctic also form part of the 
global commons?  Although the Arctic displays some 
characteristics of the global commons, it lacks one important 
element – the requirement that it should not be under the 
sovereignty of any state. 
This article looks at the impact of climate change on the 
Arctic and its people, particularly the indigenous peoples, using 
the Inuit petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights as a case study.  The article then discusses the United 
Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
particularly the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
principle.  The article looks at relevant international law 
principles and discuses whether contemporary international law 
                                                          
3 IPCC report, supra note 1 at 2. 
4 Id. at 9; see also SUSAN J. HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING CLIMATE 5 
(2007), available at http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-
warming-arctic-2004/786. See generally Erika M. Zimmerman, Valuing 
Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Incorporating the Experiences of 
Indigenous People into Global Climate Change Policies, 13 N.Y.U.  ENVTL.  
L.J. 803 (2005). 
5 See generally PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 577-98 (3rd ed. 2012).   
6 See generally SUSAN BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 
(1998).  
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is adequate to protect the rights of indigenous people, given the 
overlapping legal regimes at play in the Arctic. The article then 
discusses whether the global commons can provide a framework 
and the challenges that climate change poses for the 
contemporary legal structure.   
 
I. THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE ARCTIC 
 
The Arctic is vulnerable to many environmental issues, 
particularly climate change:  
 
The increasingly rapid rate of recent climate change 
poses new challenges to the resilience of arctic life. 
In addition to the impacts of climate change, many 
other stresses brought about by human activities are 
simultaneously affecting life in the Arctic, including 
air and water contamination, overfishing, increasing 
levels of ultraviolet radiation due to ozone depletion, 
habitat alteration and pollution due to resource 
extraction, and increasing pressure on land and 
resources related to the growing human population in 
the region. The sum of these factors threatens to 
overwhelm the adaptive capacity of some arctic 
populations and ecosystems.
7
 
 
This clearly shows that the Arctic is not immune to the 
environmental issues facing other parts of the world.  The 
problem, however, is that the impacts of climate change tend to 
be more acute in the Arctic (the Polar Regions) than in other 
parts of the world.
8
   Moreover, the ecosystem of the Arctic is 
unique and many of the environmental issues can have a lasting 
impact on the Arctic environment.  Climate Change, while being 
a global issue, has a disproportionate impact on the Polar 
                                                          
7 HASSOL, supra note 4, at 5.   
8 For a discussion of the disproportionate impact of climate change on 
various communities and regions, see International Impacts & Adaptation, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (June 21, 2013), http://www.epa.gov/climate 
change/impacts-adaptation/international.html. 
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Regions
9
 and causes the Arctic ice to melt at an alarming rate.
10
 
According to the Arctic Environmental Assessment: 
 
These climate changes are being experienced 
particularly intensely in the Arctic.  Arctic average 
temperature has risen at almost twice the rate as the 
rest of the world in the past few decades.  
Widespread melting of glaciers and sea ice and rising 
permafrost temperatures present additional evidence 
of strong arctic warming. These changes in the Arctic 
provide an early indication of the environmental and 
societal significance of global warming.
11
 
 
The Assessment summarizes the environmental and social 
impacts of climate change on the Arctic. Environmental impacts 
include: rising temperatures, rising river flows, declining snow 
cover, increasing precipitation, thawing permafrost, diminishing 
lake and river ice, melting glaciers, melting Greenland ice sheet, 
retreating summer sea ice, rising sea levels, and ocean salinity 
change as well as impacts on natural systems and society.  Social 
impacts include: loss of hunting culture, declining food security, 
human health concerns and expanding shipping.
12
   Of course, 
this latter aspect may or may not be negative. Thanks to climate 
change, the Northwest Passage between Asia and Europe 
became ice free for the first time from the Pacific to the Atlantic 
in the summer of 2007.
13
  Some may consider that this is a 
positive development in relation to navigation, as opening up 
new sea lanes that were not accessible before would 
                                                          
9 See Climate Change in the Polar Regions, G.R.I.D-ARENDAL, 
http://www.grida.no/polar/ipy/2841.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). 
10 See HASSOL, supra note 4, at 8. See generally Randall S. Abate, 
Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Arctic Melting: A Case 
Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental Human Rights, 
26 A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2 (2007). 
11 HASSOL, supra note 4, at 8. 
12 Id. These impacts are generally corroborated by IPCC report, supra 
note 1. 
13 See generally Michael Byers & Suzanne Lalonde, Who owns the 
Northwest Passage?, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.1133 (2009); TIME MAG., Oct. 
2007. 
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considerably reduce the time it takes to go from the US to 
Russia.  With access becoming more feasible, the competition 
for the region’s resources has also increased.14  Apparently, 
everybody wants a piece of the pie.  Increased access has its own 
impacts – the possibility for another ‘Exxon Valdez-type 
incident’15 cannot be ruled out. Drilling can upset the pristine 
environment of the Arctic as well as its wildlife.  Unlike the 
Antarctic, the Arctic is home to approximately 4 million people 
of which about 500,000 are indigenous peoples. The impact on 
their traditional way of life can be considerable.
16
 
The impacts of climate change on the Arctic have significant 
ramifications for other parts of the globe.  The melting of arctic 
glaciers is a major factor that contributes to rising sea-levels
17
 
and will create significant problems for small island states and 
low-lying cities.
18
  Ironically, while the Polar Regions contribute 
very little by way of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, they are 
disproportionately affected by climate change.  This raises equity 
issues, particularly in relation to indigenous communities.  While 
the contribution of these communities to climate change is 
insignificant, the contribution of the Arctic states is considerable 
with US now ranked as the second highest emitter of carbon 
dioxide.
19
  Its per capita contribution is among the highest in the 
world.
20
  Thus, these vulnerable communities, through no fault 
of their own, will suffer disproportionate consequences.  A good 
example is the Native Village of Kivalina in Alaska, which is at 
the brink of being washed into the sea. The Army Corp of 
Engineers has decided that this village, with its 400 inhabitants, 
                                                          
14 James Graff, Fight for the Top of the World, TIME MAG., Oct. 2007, at 
31. 
15 See generally Exxon Valdez, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Mar. 
28, 2013) (describing the Exxon Valdez incident), 
http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/learning/exxon.htm. 
16 See infra Part 3.1. 
17 See IPCC Report, supra note 1, at 2. 
18 See id. 
19 DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 673 (2011) [hereinafter 
HUNTER]. 
20 Id. at 674. 
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will have to be relocated at a cost of $95-125 million.
21
  It is not 
clear who will pay for the relocation.  The legal action brought 
by the Village of Kivalina against several utility companies 
failed in the US District Court for Northern District of 
California.
22
 
 
II. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE ARCTIC 
 
Discussion of the Arctic necessitates reference to the 
indigenous groups that inhabit it.
23
  According to Koivurova et 
al: 
 
The Arctic region is home to several groups of 
indigenous peoples (including Inupiat, Yup’ik and 
Aleut in Alaska, Inuit in Greenland and Canada, 
Saami in Fennoscandia and Russiaand, Yup’k, 
Chukchi, Even, Evenk, and Nenets in Russia). Out of 
the total population of 4 million people in the Arctic, 
10% are indigenous. There is a great variation of 
cultural, historical and economical backgrounds 
among the groups. However, a common feature for 
most of the indigenous communities in the Arctic is 
that they have already undergone substantial changes 
due to the globalization of the western way of life, 
                                                          
21 See Rachel M. Gregg, Relocating the Village of Kivalina, Alaska due to 
Coastal Erosion, CLIMATE ADAPTATION KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE (Dec. 18, 
2010), http://www.cakex.org/case-studies/2773. Kivalina Relocation Master 
Plan was released by the US Army Corps of Engineers in 2006 which 
determined that the best option is to relocate Kivalina. However, many of the 
sites identified for relocation were declared unsuitable due to cost, 
susceptibility to erosion and flooding and/or social and cultural objections. 
Christine Shearer, Kivalina: A Climate Change Story, TRUTHOUT (May 20, 
2012, 12:00 AM), http://truth-out.org/news/item/2187-kivalina-a-climate-
change-story (referring to an estimated cost ranging from $100 to $400 
million).  
22 Native Vill. of  Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2012), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/09/ 
25/09-17490.pdf.  See also HUNTER, supra, note 19, at 733. 
23 TIMO KOIVUROVA ET AL., BACKGROUND PAPER: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
THE ARCTIC 3 (2008), available at http://www.academia.edu/1127936/ 
Background_paper_Indigenous_peoples_and_the_Arctic. 
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state policies, modern transport and the introduction 
of mixed economy. Climate change poses a new 
threat for all of the indigenous peoples.
24
 
 
One of the main impacts of climate change will be on the 
harvesting activities of indigenous peoples.
25
  These groups rely 
on subsistence harvesting, which is not simply an economic issue 
for them but is intrinsically linked to their way of living, their 
health and their culture.
26
  Globalization coupled with climate 
change poses a challenge to this traditional way of life and may, 
“in some areas[,] remove the subsistence basis for indigenous 
identity.”27  Many cultural practices and festivals are intrinsically 
linked to traditional subsistence, which is now being threatened 
by climate change. “Ice itself is understood by Inuit as extension 
of their cultural, social and economic space, and indivisible part 
of their traditional territory; this part of their world is about to 
disappear.”28  Another feature of indigenous culture is traditional 
knowledge,
29
 which is also being threatened by climate change. 
As the Inuit petition shows, these groups are no longer able to 
rely on their knowledge of climate and nature as the changing 
climate is making their knowledge less reliable.
30
 It is against 
this backdrop that one must study the petition filed by the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference against the United States in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, which is discussed 
below.
31
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 11. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 17.. 
29 See Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 805-06. 
30 See KOIVUROVA, supra note 23, at 17.  For a discussion of the human 
rights of indigenous peoples, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, Human Rights and 
Arctic Resources, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 251 (2009).  
31 See Discussion infra Sec. II(A). 
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A. The Inuit Petition32 
 
In December 2005, the Inuit of the US and Canada, together 
with the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, filed a petition before the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
33
 They alleged 
the violation of their human rights on the basis that the US 
government, by failing to reduce its GHG emissions, is 
contributing to global climate change and, thus, shares 
responsibility for the consequential environmental changes in the 
Arctic and the resulting impacts on the lives and livelihoods of 
its Inuit inhabitants.
34
 They alleged that climate change is 
causing the Arctic region to melt at an alarming rate, “destroying 
the habitat of polar bears, seals and caribou upon which the Inuit 
depend for subsistence and cultural identity.”35  The Inuit argued 
that as a result of such changes, its traditional way of life, is 
being jeopardized, which violated their human rights.
36
 
Moreover, the petitioners argued that climate change is 
violating their right to practice their culture, as their traditional 
way of life and culture are intrinsically linked to their physical 
surroundings.
37
 They also alleged that the US, then the largest 
contributor to GHG emissions in the world, had consistently 
refused to take meaningful steps to reduce GHG emissions, 
                                                          
32 This section is based on the following work: Sumudu Atapattu, 
Climate Change, Differentiated Responsibilities and State Responsibility: 
Devising Novel Legal Strategies for Damage Caused by Climate Change, in 
CLIMATE LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES 
FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 37, 37-62 (Benjamin Richardson et al. eds., 2009). 
This section was also influenced by WAGNER & DONALD M. GOLDBERG, AN 
INUIT PETITION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 
DANGEROUS IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2004), available at 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/COP10_Handout_ECJIEL.pdf.  
33 For a summary of this petition, see Summary of the Inter American 
Commission on Human Right Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from 
Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States, 
EARTHJUSTICE, (Dec. 7, 2005) http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/library/ 
legal_docs/summary-of-inuit-petition-to-inter-american-council-on-human-
rights.pdf. [hereinafter Petition Summary]. 
34 Id.  
35 Abate, supra note 10, at 5. 
36 Petition Summary, supra note 33 
37 Id. 
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despite having ratified the UNFCCC.
38
 The specific rights that 
they alleged were violated include the right to: use and enjoy 
traditional lands; enjoy personal property; health and life; 
residence and movement, and inviolability of the home; their 
own means of subsistence; and culture, to the extent that it is 
recognized under international law.
39
 The requested relief 
included (i) preparing a report, with facts and applicable law, 
declaring that the US is internationally responsible for the 
violation of rights embodied in the American Declaration on 
Rights and Duties of Man;
40
 (ii) holding a hearing; (iii) adopting 
and implementing a plan to protect the Inuit land and resources; 
and (iv) providing assistance to the Inuit to adapt to the impacts 
caused by climate change where they cannot be avoided.  
While the strategy of using the human rights framework in 
relation to environmental issues is not new,
41
 this was the first 
instance where it was used in relation to a global environmental 
problem.  Despite the fact that the petition itself was dismissed, 
it succeeded in many other respects: it gave a human face to 
climate change, a problem that was hitherto largely considered  
an environmental problem. It also highlighted that the 
consequences of climate change are taking place now, 
dismantling the widely held belief that climate change is an 
abstract issue that will give rise to undetermined consequences 
for ‘future generations.’42  Although the Inter-American 
Commission initially declined to entertain the petition, after a 
renewed request in January 2007, the Commission invited Sheila 
Watt-Cloutier, the then Chairperson of the Inuit Circumpolar 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, INTER-AM. 
COMMISSION ON HUM. RTS., http://www.cidh.oas.org/ Basicos/English/Basic2. 
american%20Declaration.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). 
41 See generally Abate, supra note 10; Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a 
Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human Right 
to a Healthy Environment Under International Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 65 
(2002).  
42 See David Hunter, The Implications of Climate Change Litigation: 
Litigation for International Environmental Law-Making, in ADJUDICATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 
(William Burns and Hari Osofsky eds., 2009). 
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Conference, Martin Wagner of Earthjustice and Daniel Magraw 
of the Center for International Environmental Law to a hearing 
on climate change and human rights on March 1, 2007.
43
  
The petition filed by the Inuit before the Inter-American 
Commission demonstrated that the damage being caused by 
climate change in the Arctic region is indeed significant. Quoting 
from the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the petition noted: 
 
The Arctic is extremely vulnerable to observed and 
projected climate change and its impacts. The Arctic 
is now experiencing some of the most rapid and 
severe climate change on Earth. Over the next 100 
years, climate change is expected to accelerate, 
contributing to major physical, ecological, social, and 
economic changes, many of which have already 
begun.
44
 
 
Although the outcome of the case did not bring relief to the 
petitioners, it certainly brought international attention to the 
issue, which was one of the objectives of the petitioners.
45
  At 
the time the petition was filed before the Inter-American 
Commission, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) had not been adopted. The next 
section discusses the salient features of UNDRIP and 
particularly, the principle of free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) and the relevance of that principle to indigenous groups 
in the Arctic. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Jonathon Spicer, Hearing to Probe Climate Change and Inuit Rights,  
REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/21/us-
globalwarming-arctic-rights-idUSN204267120070221.  
44 HASSOL, supra note 4, at 10. 
45 See Hunter, supra note 42. 
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III. INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES46 AND THE RELEVANCE OF 
FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT  
 
After nearly two decades of negotiations the UNDRIP
47
 was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, ending years of 
contentious wrangling surrounding the Declaration.
48
 It endorsed 
the right of indigenous peoples to the full enjoyment of all 
human rights as recognized in the UN Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights 
law.  In addition, it endorsed the right of equality and non-
discrimination
49
 as well as the right to self-determination.  
Article 8 incorporates the right against forced assimilation, and 
Article 11 endorses the right to practice cultural traditions.
50
  
Furthermore, the Declaration recognizes the right of indigenous 
peoples to practice spiritual and religious traditions, customs and 
ceremonies and the right to lands, territories and resources that 
have been traditionally owned, used, or occupied by these 
                                                          
46 See Jeremy Firestone, Jonathan Lilley & Isabel Torres de Noronha, 
Cultural Diversity, Human Rights, and the Emergence of Indigenous Peoples in 
International and Comparative Environmental Law, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
219 (2005). 
47 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. 
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf [hereinafter 
DRIPS]. 
48 Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent: 
Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within International Law, 10 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 54,  58 (2011). 
49 See KOIVUROVA, supra note 23, at 20-21 (arguing that the general 
principles of equality and non-discrimination were insufficient to protect 
indigenous peoples and therefore, specific instruments like ILO 169 were 
necessary).  
50 DRIPS, supra note 47.  See also Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, art. 2, Oct. 20, 2005, 2440 
U.N.T.S. 311, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/ 
142919e.pdf (stating the principle that “[t]he protection and promotion of the 
diversity of cultural expressions presuppose the recognition of equal dignity of 
and respect for all cultures, including the cultures of persons belonging to 
minorities and indigenous peoples”). 
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peoples.
51
  Despite its importance, the Declaration remains a soft 
law instrument. 
The Declaration also endorses the free, prior and informed 
consent principle in relation to indigenous peoples in certain 
instances. It combines the earlier formulations found in ILO 
Convention No 169
52
 and the World Bank Operational 
Procedure
53
 and clearly establishes the free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC) as the norm to be applied in relation to 
indigenous rights.
54
  Tara Ward contends that FPIC has been 
articulated as an application of the right to self-determination 
rather than as a derivative right to culture or the right to non-
discrimination.
55
  However, it can be argued that FPIC stems 
largely from participatory rights and the word “consent” in the 
Declaration implies the right of veto.
56
  While UNDRIP is a soft 
law document, many of the provisions embody international 
human rights principles and, to that extent, reflect customary 
international law in relation to indigenous people.
57
  It is not 
clear, however, whether FPIC falls into this category.  Given the 
history behind its evolution, the lack of consensus on its 
                                                          
51 DRIPS, supra note 47. 
52 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, June 27, 1989, ILO 169, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO:: 
P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.  
53 The World Bank, B.P. 4.10, (July 2005), available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/
EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20553664~menuPK:64701637~pagePK:64
709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html. 
54 Ward, supra note 48, at 58. 
55 Id.  See also, Catherine Irons Magallanes, Indigenous Rights and 
Democratic Rights in International Law: An “Uncomfortable Fit?,” 15 UCLA 
J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 111, 115 (2010). 
56 Again, this is a contentious issue:  
 
[F]or some indigenous rights advocates, FPIC is seen as a right to 
veto projects, while others argue that FPIC is not meant to be a 
veto right, but rather a way of ensuring that indigenous peoples 
meaningfully participate in decisions directly impacting their 
lands, territories, and resources. 
 
See Ward, supra note 48, at 58. 
57 See Bratspies, supra note 30, at 277 (noting that the status of the 
Declaration remains “ambiguous”).  
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parameters, and the fact that it seems to be observed more in the 
breach, it is unlikely that FPIC is part of customary international 
law.  However, the adoption of UNDRIP is an important 
milestone because it creates norms that can shape states’ 
behavior and subject states’ activities to international scrutiny.  
While the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – states with 
sizeable indigenous populations - did not initially support the 
Declaration, all four states have since signed it.   
UNDRIP refers to FPIC in four specific instances: (a) Article 10 
that deals with forcible removal from indigenous land, (b) 
Article 19 that deals with adopting and implementing legislation 
and administrative measures that may affect indigenous peoples, 
(c) Article 29 on storage or disposal of hazardous materials on 
indigenous land, and (d) Article 32 that deals with development 
projects.
58
  This is the first time that FPIC has received such 
specific articulation in so many different contexts. 
 
A. FPIC – What Does It Mean? 
 
Over the years, we have seen many examples of 
development projects that have been implemented without 
adequate participation by the relevant stakeholders.  Very often 
people learn of projects and imminent displacement only when 
the bulldozers arrive.  By then, all the decisions have been made 
and it is too late to protest.  The World Bank has been guilty of 
these practices, particularly in relation to indigenous people.
59
  
These communities were often seen as obstacles to development.  
In their letter to the incoming president of the World Bank, 
indigenous groups stressed that the adverse impacts on 
indigenous people are rarely acknowledged, let alone addressed, 
by the Bank.  It further noted that the current operational policy 
on indigenous peoples is not based on a human rights approach 
and is inconsistent with UNDRIP. “It is particularly a glaring 
                                                          
58 Spicer, supra note 43. 
59 See World Bank: Power Project Threatens Indigenous Peoples, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (July 11, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2012/07/11/ 
world-bank-power-project-threatens-indigenous-peoples.  
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fact that the World Bank is the only Multilateral Development 
Bank that does not recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to 
free, prior and informed consent.”60  Likewise, in its letter to the 
President of the Bank, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) stressed 
the need to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and the 
environment before it funds a power transmission line 
connecting Kenya to a dam in Ethiopia.
61
  HRW noted that while 
the project’s goal is to provide electricity to people in Kenya, 
where more than 80% of the population has no access to 
electricity, the Bank has been unwilling to apply its social and 
environmental safeguard policies.
62
  It pointed out that “rights of 
hundreds of thousands of indigenous people” would be 
threatened by the Gibe III dam:
63
 
 
The World Bank requires that projects it funds follow 
its policies and procedures to mitigate adverse 
environmental and social impacts.  If a project will 
result in the loss of livelihood, the bank requires 
effective consultation with the affected people, 
adequately compensating them for their losses, and 
ensuring that they can at least maintain their previous 
living standards under the new circumstances.  When 
indigenous people are involved, the bank’s policy 
requires additional procedures to ensure that the 
consultation, compensation and relocation process 
respects the cultural and physical needs of the 
affected community.
64
 
 
                                                          
60Letter from 98 Indigenous Peoples’ Orgs. & Institutions & 43 Non-
Governmental Orgs. to John Kim, Incoming President of the World Bank , 
available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/ 
2012/06/indigenous-peoples-letter-incoming-president-world-bank-english.pdf.   
61 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, World Bank: Power Project Threathens 
Indigenous People: Rigorously Apply Social, Environmental Safeguards in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, (July 11, 2012) http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/11/world-
bank-power-project-threatens-indigenous-peoples . 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
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The HRW called on the Bank to: fully examine the social 
and environmental impacts of the transmission system before 
proceeding with the project; rigorously apply its policies relating 
to environmental assessment, involuntary settlement and 
indigenous peoples to the project; urge the Ethiopian government 
to protect rights relating to freedom of expression, association 
and assembly; and enhance monitoring and supervision of all 
projects in Ethiopia.
65
 
Similarly, in November 2011, the Indian Law Resource 
Center (ILRC) alerted the indigenous community to a new 
development at the Bank, which seeks to introduce a new loan 
program, called the “Program for Results (P4R).”66 P4R would 
do away with critical safeguards that protect indigenous people
67
.  
No consultations  have been held with indigenous people with 
regard to this new policy.
68
  If adopted, ILRC stressed, it would 
“virtually eliminate 26 of the Bank’s safeguard policies, 
including those [relating] to indigenous people.” 69 . The idea is 
to fund programs initiated by borrower governments, which will 
rely on borrower governments’ laws and protections with regard 
to environmental and social risk assessment, management and 
enforcement, bypassing the Bank’s safeguards.70  In many of 
these countries these safeguards may not be sufficient. In 
addition to eliminating protection for indigenous peoples, it has 
no effective complaint mechanism for them either.
71
 
Making use of the Bank’s Inspection Panel, Anuak 
indigenous people from Ethiopia’s Gambella region submitted a 
complaint, implicating the Bank in the human rights abuses 
                                                          
65 Id.. 
66 The World Bank, OP 9.00 – Program-for-Results Financing, 
OPERATIONAL MANUAL (providing an overview of PforR).   
67 See THE WORLD BANK, PROGRAM-FOR-RESULTS FINANCING 1-2 (2011), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTRESLENDING/ 
Resources/7514725-1313522321940/PforR_Overview_12.2011.pdf. 
68 John Schertow, Call on the World Bank to Respect Indigenous Peoples, 
Before It’s Too Late!, IC MAGAZINE  (Nov. 9, 2011) 
http://intercontinentalcry.org/call-on-the-world-bank-to-respect-indigenous-
peoples-before-its-too-late/.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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committed by the Ethiopian government.
72
  They alleged that 
they were severely harmed by the Protection of Basic Services 
Project (PBS) financed by the Bank, which they claimed was 
contributing to a program of forced “villagization.”73  They 
referred to similar occurrences in four other regions of Ethiopia 
and reported a process involving intimidation, beatings, torture, 
rape and extra-judicial killings:  
 
In the Gambella region, villagization has been carried 
out by force and accompanied by gross violations of 
human rights.  Through the Villagization Program, 
the Anuak people, including the Requesters and their 
families and communities, have been victims of inter 
alia threats and harassment; arbitrary arrest and 
detention; beatings and assault in some cases, leading 
to death; torture in custody; rape and other sexual 
violence; forced displacement from traditional lands, 
homes and livelihoods; destruction of property 
including housing and crops; and inhumane 
conditions at the new villages including a lack of 
access to food and livelihood opportunities, in some 
cases leading to starvation.”
74
 
 
The complainants stressed that relocation was not voluntary, 
and when they refused to move to the new location, they were 
beaten.
75
 One complainant alleged that one of his brothers was 
beaten to death by soldiers and another, whose location is 
unknown, was detained.
76
  It is clear that relocation of 
                                                          
72 Ethiopian Indigenous People Demand Accountability from World Bank 
for Contributing to Grave Human Rights Abuses, INCLUSIVE DEV. INT’L (Sept. 
24, 2012), http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/ethiopian-indigenous-people-
demand-accountability-from-the-world-bank-for-contribution-to-grave-human-
rights-abuses/. 
73 Id. 
74 Policy and Legal Analysis of the Ethiopia PBS Request for Inspection, 
INCLUSIVE DEV. INT’L 6, available at http://www.inclusivedevelopment.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Legal-and-Policy-Analysis-for-Anuak-Request-for-
Inspection.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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indigenous people without consultation is contrary to the World 
Bank Operative Policy on Indigenous People.
77
   
While common sense dictates that FPIC requires non-
coerced, freely given consent, based on relevant information, 
provided in a timely manner, and given prior to any decisions 
being made, it is hard to find an authoritative pronouncement on 
the issue. The Inter-American System of Human Rights has been 
most vocal, although the other tribunals and human rights bodies 
have also sought to elaborate on rights of indigenous peoples. 
B. Case Law 
 
The Inter-American human rights system has been at the 
forefront of articulating indigenous rights.  Mayagna (Sumo) 
Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua
78
 was the first time that 
the collective property rights of indigenous peoples were 
recognized.  In the case of Mary and Carrie Dann v. US
79
 the 
Inter-American Commission found that the US had violated the 
Danns’ right to equality under the law, right to a fair trial and the 
right to property.  The state also failed to fulfill its obligation to 
ensure that the status of the Western Shoshone traditional lands 
was “determined through a process of informed and mutual 
consent on the part of the Western Shoshone people as a 
whole.”80  Thus, any determination with regard to indigenous 
lands must “be based on fully informed consent of the whole 
community, meaning that all members be fully informed and 
have the chance to participate.”81  In Maya Communities of the 
Toledo District v. Belize,
82
 the Commission held that Belize 
violated property rights of indigenous peoples by granting 
concessions on the lands “without effective consultations with 
                                                          
77 See Discussion, supra Sec. III(A). 
78 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
79 Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02, doc. 5 rev. ¶ 
1 at 860, XX (2002). 
80 Ward, supra note 48, at 62. 
81 Id. at 62-63. 
82 Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n. H.R., Report No 40/04, 
OEA/Ser./L./V/II 122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004). 
394 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1 
 
and the informed consent of the Maya people.”83  The 
Commission stressed that the duty to consult is a fundamental 
component of the state’s obligations with regard to communal 
property rights and that consultation with the goal of obtaining 
consent is required.
84
 
The case of Saramaka People v. Suriname
85
 is very 
important in many respects and clearly adopts the principle of 
FPIC.  It also discusses when it is permissible to subordinate 
property rights in the interests of society.
86
  In this case, the 
Surinamese government had granted resource concessions to 
private companies within the territories of the Saramaka people 
without obtaining their consent or consulting them.
87
  The Court 
held that Suriname had violated the rights of the Saramaka 
people to judicial protection and property rights and failed to 
have effective mechanisms to protect them from acts that violate 
their rights to property.  However, the Court noted that these 
property rights are not absolute and the State has the right to 
restrict property rights in the interests of society.  These 
restrictions must be previously established by law, necessary, 
proportionate, and with the aim of achieving a legitimate 
objective in a democratic society.
88
  Moreover, such restrictions 
cannot violate the right of indigenous peoples to survival.
89
  In 
order to restrict property rights, the Court prescribed a series of 
safeguards: (a) states must ensure effective participation of the 
affected parties; (b) guarantee that the affected people will 
receive a reasonable benefit from the project; (c) prior to 
granting the concession, environmental and social impacts must 
be evaluated in order to mitigate any negative impacts. 
90
 
Furthermore, participation must be in line with their customs 
and traditions; states have a duty to disseminate and receive 
                                                          
83 Ward, supra note 48, at 63. 
84 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 67. 
85 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007) available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/AwasTingnicase.html. 
86 Id. ¶ 143. 
87 Id. ¶ 142. 
88 Id. ¶ 173. 
89 Id. ¶ 112. 
90 Id. ¶ 106. 
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information; and consultations must be in good faith, culturally 
appropriate and have the intent to reach an agreement.  In the 
case of large-scale development projects that could impact the 
survival of indigenous people, states must obtain their free, prior 
and informed consent.
91
  This case endorses several important 
principles and sheds light on what ‘consultation’ entails.  The 
Court limited the application of FPIC to large-scale development 
projects that threaten the survival of indigenous people.  The 
language of UNDRIP in relation to FPIC, however, is not so 
restrictive. Article 32 that deals with development strategies 
provides that: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine 
and develop priorities and strategies for the 
development or use of their lands or territories 
and other resources. 
 
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith 
with the indigenous peoples concerned through 
their own representative institutions in order to 
obtain their free and informed consent prior to 
the approval of any project affecting their lands 
or territories and other resources, particularly in 
connection with the development, utilization or 
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
 
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for 
just and fair redress for any such activities, and 
appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate 
adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact.
92
 
 
Article 32 is not restricted to situations where the survival of 
the indigenous peoples is at jeopardy.  FPIC is required prior to 
approving any project that affects lands of indigenous people.  
While the decision in Saramaka seems rather restrictive from 
                                                          
91 Ward, supra note 48, at 64 (noting that the case clearly set a precedent 
within the Inter-American system). 
92 DRIP, supra note 47, art. 32. 
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that point of view, it did endorse the importance of effective 
consultations.
93
 
In Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador,
94
 the Commission 
argued that the State of Ecuador violated, inter alia, the right to 
participate in government by failing to effectively consult with 
the affected communities prior to granting licenses to explore for 
oil.
95
  The Commission argued that there is an implicit obligation 
to ensure prior consultations that require effective participation 
of indigenous peoples with regard to any development.
96
  It 
further articulated that the “information provided to the affected 
people must be in clear and accessible language, and that the 
information provided be sufficient and complete enough to 
guarantee that if consent is given, it has been given free from 
manipulation.”97  Such consultations must be held sufficiently in 
advance and the right to prior consultation “implies the right to 
play a real role in the decision-making process.”98  The Inter-
American Court held that the “State must consult the Sarayaku 
People in a prior, adequate and effective manner, and in full 
compliance with the relevant international standards applicable, 
in the event that it seeks to carry out any activity or project for 
the extraction of natural resources on its territory, or any 
investment or development plan of any other type that could 
involve a potential impact on their territory…”99  
Thus, these cases endorse that, at a minimum, there is an 
obligation to consult with indigenous peoples when decisions are 
being made with regard to their lands and resources.  Some 
institutions have extended this requirement to FPIC, but that 
                                                          
93 Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique 
of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of 
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 51 (2009) (agreeing that the formulation applied by the Inter-
American Court falls short of the standard in UNDRIP). 
94 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012). available at 
http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_245_ing.pdf 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 65. 
98 Id. 
99 Pasqualucci, supra note 93, at 92. 
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right seems to be emerging rather than fully entrenched in 
international law. If a project involves relocation of indigenous 
people or could threaten their survival, it is safe to assume that 
obtaining their consent is a requirement.  
However, in practice, this requirement, as laudable as it is, 
may run into problems.  Indigenous groups are not homogenous 
and may speak different languages, or at least dialects, or may 
have different priorities.  Where there are several indigenous 
groups, does FPIC require the State to obtain the consent of all 
the groups at least in instances where relocation is envisaged?  
The challenges of applying FPIC are illustrated by Baker in her 
case study of the Oaxaca wind project in Mexico.
100
 Communal 
land, language issues, one sided contracts, title to land, coercion 
and environmental concerns are some of the challenges facing 
the community.
101
  
Thus, one can safely argue that, with regard to drilling for oil 
or other minerals in the Arctic, FPIC should be applied as such 
activities have the potential to relocate the indigenous 
communities or threaten their very survival.  It is not clear 
whether FPIC would apply in relation to the Northwest Passage, 
although oil pollution and increased traffic and tourism can pose 
significant challenges to these indigenous communities. An 
argument can be made that FPIC should apply given the 
                                                          
100 See Shalanda Baker, Why the IFO’s free, prior, and informed consent 
policy doesn’t matter (yet) to indigenous communities affected by development 
projects WILJ (forthcoming, 2014)) 
101 Id. Another case that involved the violation of rights of indigenous 
peoples was the Ogoni case before the African Commission on Human 
Rights.  The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Afr. Comm’n H.R., Commc’n No. 
155/96, ¶ 69 (2001).  The Commission, relying on the African Charter, found 
the violation of, inter alia, rights to life, environment, property, health, food, 
housing, standard of living and called upon the Nigerian government to ensure 
that appropriate compensation is provided to victims of human rights 
violations, ensuring appropriate environmental and social impact assessments 
are prepared for future oil development and provide information on health and 
environmental risks and meaningful access to regulatory and decision-making 
bodies to communities likely to be affected by oil operations. 
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potential impact on these vulnerable communities and their 
traditional way of life.
102
  
 
IV. USING THE GLOBAL COMMONS AS A FRAMEWORK 
 
With regard to the indigenous peoples in the Arctic, several 
regimes of international law interact with one another: 
international human rights law with particular reference to rights 
of indigenous people; law of the sea to the extent that it involves 
new sea lanes opening up and with regard to marine pollution; 
environmental protection of the Arctic and the Arctic Council.  
Given the similarities between the polar regions and the pristine 
nature of the Arctic environment, the question arises whether we 
should look at the global commons as a framework to govern the 
Arctic. 
 
A. Governance of the Arctic103 
 
Currently, there are eight Arctic nations (US, Canada, 
Norway, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, Finland and Iceland).  They 
adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991.
104
   
The Arctic Council was established in 1996 “as a high level 
intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting 
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic 
States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous 
communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic 
                                                          
102 See Zimmerman, supra note 3 (arguing that the climate change crisis 
in the Arctic presents two problems from an environmental justice perspective: 
(a) ignoring the traditional ecological knowledge and failing to consult 
indigenous groups in policy decisions deprives them their right to participate in 
climate change policies; (b) climate change poses a distributive justice problem 
because indigenous communities will bear a disproportionate burden of the 
negative consequences of climate change). 
103 For a good overview of the legal regime, see Linda Nowlan, Arctic 
Legal Regime for Environmental Protection, IUCN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY & 
LAW PAPER NO. 44 (2001).  See also, Stephanie Holmes, Breaking the Ice: 
Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 323 (2008). 
104 See Barry Hart Dubner, On the Basis for Creation of a New Method of 
Defining International, Jurisdiction in the Arctic Ocean, 13 MO. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1 (2005) 
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issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the Arctic.”105  Thus, the Arctic 
Council is unique as it provides for the participation of 
indigenous communities as permanent participants.
106
  Prior to 
the adoption of multilateral action, there were several unilateral 
actions by Arctic states, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act enacted by Canada in 1970 being the best-known 
example.
107
   
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) identifies 
the following as its main objectives: (a) to protect the Arctic 
ecosystem, including humans; (b) to provide for the protection, 
enhancement and restoration of the environmental quality and 
sustainable utilization of natural resources; (c) to recognize and 
to the extent possible, accommodate the traditional and cultural 
practices of indigenous peoples; (d) review the state of the Arctic 
environment regularly; and (e) eliminate pollution.
108
   
While the establishment of the Arctic regime may have been 
influenced by the Antarctic regime,
109
 one cannot ignore the 
contrasting features of the two regimes: while the Antarctic 
                                                          
105About the Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/about-
arctic-council. 
106 Six indigenous groups are permanent participants of the Council:  
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC); Aleut International Association (AIA); 
Gwich'in Council International (GGI); Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC); 
Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON); and Saami Council 
(SC), available at http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-
us/permanentparticipants. 
107 See Dubner, supra note 104 (contending that this unilateral 
intervention was “an excellent idea.”). This legislation prohibited waste 
discharge and had extensive regulation within 100 miles from the northern 
coast of Canada. This action by Canada was much criticized claiming that 
Canada was exercising extra territorial jurisdiction over much of the Arctic 
Ocean.  While Canada defended its act, multilateral action is preferable to 
unilateral action even if the objective is to protect the environment.  See also, 
Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde, supra note 13. 
108 See Dubner, supra note 104. 
109 For an overview of the Antarctic Treaty System, see SANDS, supra 
note 5; See also, Erika Lennon, A Tale of Two Poles: A Comparative Look at 
the Legal Regimes in the Arctic and the Antarctic, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. & 
POL’Y 32 (2008). 
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regime is binding on parties, the Arctic regime remains a soft 
law attempt with none of the instruments adopted by the parties 
having any binding effect.
110
  Second, the Antarctic is virtually 
uninhabited, making preservation and banning certain activities 
more feasible, whereas the Arctic has four million inhabitants, 
approximately 10% of whom are indigenous peoples.
111
 Finally, 
eight nations have sovereignty over the Arctic whereas territorial 
claims over the Antarctic are frozen.  Thus, while the two Polar 
Regions display similar environmental characteristics, the legal 
regimes governing them are quite different.  Dubner argues that 
“[t]he two objectives of the Arctic Council – the promotion of 
protection of the environment and implementation of sustainable 
development – are inconsistent in the Arctic’s fragile 
environment.”112  It is unclear why he argues that these two 
objectives are inconsistent; however, his argument about 
voluntary action hindering progress in the Arctic and sovereignty 
claims over resources has some merit: 
 
A proposed international regime designed to protect 
the future of the Arctic region will be impossible to 
create unless States are willing to give up sovereignty 
to their natural resources, such as oil and minerals.  
                                                          
110 See SANDS, supra note 5, at 597 (noting that the soft law approach is a 
first step, but “ultimately it will be necessary to establish appropriate 
institutional arrangements and substantive rules, perhaps similar to those 
applied in the Antarctic, to ensure that agreed obligations are respected and 
enforced. ”). 
111 Peoples of the Arctic, ARCTIC COUNCIL http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/environment-and-people/arctic-peoples/122-peoples-
of-the-arctic (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).  
112 See Dubner, supra note 104.  Several factors contribute to the 
problems facing the Arctic region: (a) low temperatures of the region resulting 
in slow decomposition of pollutants; (b) Arctic flora regeneration is slow due to 
cold temperatures, frozen earth and limited sunlight; (c) lack of wildlife 
diversity due to climatic conditions; (d) marine areas both as habitat and 
feeding grounds, play a more significant role in the Arctic than in other areas; 
(e) Arctic climate is highly susceptible to global warming trends; and (f) greater 
difficulty of cleaning up the Arctic environment due to the frigid conditions 
there. In addition, other countries are contributing to the problems in the Arctic 
by heavy metal pollutants, the Arctic Haze, chemical and toxins coming from 
ocean dumping etc.  
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The States must shift their focus away from voluntary 
actions to a binding regional regime and, in the 
future, to an international regime.
113
 
 
However, most of the environmental problems in the 
Arctic,
114
 including changes in the climate, originate from other 
parts of the world.  Thus, international action and particularly 
greater international cooperation is needed to address this issue.  
With regard to climate change, which is having the greatest 
impact on the Polar Regions, it may already be too late to 
mitigate consequences caused by greenhouse gases already 
emitted into the atmosphere. 
One of the justifications that Canada put forward in enacting 
the Arctic Pollution Prevention Act was that the preservation of 
the Arctic Ocean was for the benefit of mankind and that Canada 
was acting as the trustee.
115
  Canada later changed this to state 
that the Arctic Ocean is a fragile ecosystem that needed to be 
protected from vessels.
116
  However, its assertion of acting as the 
trustee for all mankind is interesting and points towards the 
notion that the Arctic Ocean can at least be considered as part of 
the global commons.  According to Koivurova et al., Norway has 
lived up to its obligations under Article 14 of the ILO 
Convention by enacting the Finnmark Act in 2005,
117
 which 
recognized Saami rights to land and water. A draft for a Nordic 
Saami Convention is also in the works, but as of now, it has not 
been adopted.
118
  
 
 
                                                          
113 Id.  
114 See generally TIMO KOIVUROVA, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT IN THE ARCTIC: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 
(2003). 
115
 See Dubner, supra note 104. 
116 Id. 
117 Finnmark Act (Act No. 85 of June 17, 2005 relating to Legal 
Relations and Management of Land and Natural Resources in the County of 
Finnmark), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=11129. 
118 See Timo Koivurova, The Draft Nordic Saami Convention: Nations 
Working Together, 10 INT’L CMTY. L. REV. 279  (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1860313. 
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As Duncan Currie points out: 
 
It is ironic that both climate change, and the oil and 
gas that has given rise to climate change, threaten to 
embroil the Arctic Ocean and bordering States in 
disputes over sovereignty, access to resources, 
navigation and the protection of the environment. 
The use of the Northwest Passage by tankers or other 
vessels may be facilitated by the melting of Arctic ice 
due to climate change, but other changes brought 
about by climate change, including icebergs, 
movement of ice and changed currents, mean that any 
such use will bring new risks to the Arctic 
environment.
119
  
 
B. Global Commons 
 
Does the global commons framework provide an additional 
tool here? What are the characteristics of the global commons?
120
  
The basic feature is that they lie beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction – in other words, they cannot be subject to the 
jurisdiction of any state.  The high seas, outer space and 
Antarctica are generally considered as falling within the category 
of global commons.  More recently, and with the advent of 
global environmental problems such as climate change, scholars 
have called for the expansion of this status to the Arctic.
121
  
However, as pointed out earlier, unlike other global commons 
areas, the Arctic is subject to the sovereignty of eight states.   
                                                          
119 See Duncan Currie, Sovereignty and Conflict in the Arctic Due to 
Climate Change: Climate Change and the Legal Status of the Arctic Ocean, 11 
(Aug. 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/arctic%20%20and%20climate 
%20change.pdf.  
120 See generally SUSAN BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION (1998); JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE (2d ed. 2000) (describing 
the global commons). 
121 See KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF 
MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Kluwer Law 1998); HUNTER, supra note 19, 
at 453. 
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Many scholars contend that the common heritage of 
mankind principle (CHM) should apply to the resources of the 
global commons.
122
  While the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources applies in relation to 
resources within states, the common heritage principle applies in 
relation to resources outside the sovereignty of states.
123
  Before 
sustainable development was adopted as a framing principle for 
many environmental issues, the “right of capture” applied in 
relation to the resources in the high seas (particularly fisheries); 
this favored those states that were more technologically 
advanced.
124
 The rapid depletion of fisheries (a typical ‘tragedy 
of the commons’ issue) led to the adoption of different principles 
and frameworks to ensure that all states had equal access to these 
resources, at least in theory.
125
 Sustainable development and 
sustainable exploitation of resources also influenced the 
development of these new principles. 
While a detailed discussion of the common heritage 
principle is beyond the scope of this paper, the concept is 
considered to include at least four features: (a) non 
appropriation; (b) international management; (c) sharing of 
benefits; and (d) reservation for peaceful purposes.
126
  Some add 
preservation for future generations as the fifth criterion,
127
 which 
                                                          
122 See Valnora Leister & Mark Frazier, From Local to Global Commons: 
Applying Ostrom’s Key Principles for Sustainable Governance, available at 
http://www.lund2012.earthsystemgovernance.org/LC2012-paper94.pdf. 
123 See HUNTER, supra note 19, at 452. 
124 Id. at 453. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 455. 
127 See BASLAR, supra note 121, at 81 (quoting Ambassador Pardo of 
Malta who is considered as the father of this concept: 
[I]n the Maltese view the common heritage concept has five basic 
implications. First, the common heritage of mankind could not be 
appropriated; it was open to use by all international community. 
Second, it required a system of management in which all users 
have a right to share.  Third, it implied an active sharing of 
benefits, not only financial but also benefits driver from shared 
management and transfer of technology, thus radically 
transforming the conventional relationships between states and 
traditional concepts of common heritage implied reservation for 
peaceful purposes, insofar as politically achievable, and fifth, it 
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reflects the influence of sustainable development.  While many 
of these features are uncontroversial, the requirement that 
benefits arising from the exploitation of these resources should 
be shared led to an outcry.
128
  Two global commons regimes 
incorporate this principle -Outer Space Treaty
129
 and the Law of 
the Sea Convention
130
 in relation to deep seabed mining.
131
 The 
Antarctica regime does not include it probably because there is a 
fifty-year moratorium on mineral exploitation under the Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.
132
 The 
support for this concept is divided along developed and 
developing country lines, similar to many other principles of 
international environmental law, including the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle
133
 and the right to 
development.
134
 
Thus, what does this framework offer our discussion?  Some 
aspects of the global commons framework are applicable to the 
Arctic and given the fragile nature of the Arctic environment and 
given how the Polar Regions affect and, in turn, are affected by 
climate change, international management becomes imperative, 
despite the sovereignty of the eight Arctic nations.  That does not 
pose a threat to sovereignty.  Just like states accept other 
international obligations, the Arctic, too, will be subject to 
international obligations.  The establishment of the Arctic 
                                                                                                                   
implied reservation for future generations, and thus environmental 
implications). 
128 Part XI on “The Area” (that deals with deep seabed mining) in the 
Law of the Sea Convention, 1982 was later amended due to the objections of 
many developed countries, including the US, see Hunter, supra note 19, at 457. 
See also UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
387 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
129 Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 
27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
130 UNCLOS, supra note 128, art. 136. 
131 Id. Part XI. 
132 See SANDS, supra note 5, at 586.  The Protocol is available at ATS, 
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
http://www.ats.aq/e/ep.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
133 See HUNTER, supra note 19, at 464-467. 
134 Id. at 446-452. 
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Council and the adoption of several declarations show that the 
Arctic nations are on the right track.  However, apart from one 
treaty that covers polar bears, none of the instruments adopted by 
the Arctic states so far are binding.   
 
V. CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The main challenge for international law will be to reconcile 
the various overlapping legal regimes at play in the Arctic: 
international environmental law, legal regime governing climate 
change, international human rights law, law of the sea including 
marine pollution, navigation and dumping at sea, rights of 
indigenous peoples, the global commons framework, the Arctic 
Council and its emerging legal regime.  Sometimes these 
regimes may complement one another and, at times, they may 
conflict with one another.    
When an issue involves indigenous communities, the 
question arises, whether FPIC should be the overarching 
principle and, without the free, prior and informed consent of 
indigenous peoples, whether a particular project can go ahead.  
While it would be desirable to apply this principle in relation to 
all activities, it seems unlikely that states would consult with 
indigenous groups prior to engaging in shipping in this region.  
Moreover, FPIC is applied in relation to indigenous peoples and 
in the Arctic, only about 500,000 people out of four million 
inhabitants belong to an indigenous group.  Thus, is there any 
obligation to consult with other inhabitants? Applying 
procedural principles of international environmental law and 
international human rights law, one can certainly argue that 
participatory rights of these people should be respected and 
upheld and that there is certainly an obligation on states to 
provide timely information and give an opportunity to those who 
could be affected by a particular activity to be heard.  
With climate change, the Northwest Passage has opened 
up,
135
 which can cause additional challenges along with a rush to 
                                                          
135 See Graff, supra note 14 (noting that for the first time in recorded 
history, the Norwest Passage was ice-free from the Pacific to the Atlantic); see 
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exploit resources in that area.
136
  As Currie points out: “[i]t may 
well be that international interest in protecting the fragile Arctic 
marine environment from oil spills will require more than coastal 
state controls and include prohibitions on transport and mineral 
extraction, where necessary.”137  While the extent of the 
resources in the Arctic is not clear, a US Geological Survey 
study estimates that the Arctic contains two hundred and fifty 
five of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves.138  International 
law will have to deal with the new challenges posed by these 
emerging issues.  
 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In sum, the problems facing the Arctic will be compounded 
by climate change,
139
 which will be the main threat to the region 
in the coming years.
140
 The Tromso Declaration,
141
 adopted by 
the Arctic Council in 2009, emphasized that human-induced 
climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing the Arctic 
and that preserving the Arctic environment depends mainly on 
                                                                                                                   
also Matthew L. Hoppe, Environmental Protection for the New Northwest 
Passage, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y  69, 70 (2008). 
136 Graff, supra note 14 (stating “[b]ut now that global warming has 
rendered the Arctic more accessible than ever – and yet at the same time more 
fragile – a new frenzy has broken out for control of the trade routes at the top of 
the world and the riches that nations hope and believe may lie beneath the 
ice.”) (emphasis in the original); see also Currie, supra note 119, where he 
refers to Exxon Valdez type incidents in the northern latitudes. 
137 Currie, supra note 119, at 11. 
138 Graff, supra note 14. See also Dubner, supra note 104 (noting that the 
Artic contains both onshore and offshore oil and gas reserves as well as large 
coal reserves).   
139 See Duncan French & Karen Scott, International Legal Implications 
of Climate Change for the Polar Regions: Too Much, Too Little, Too Late?, 10 
MELB. J. INT’L L. 631 (2009). 
140 See HASSOL, supra note 4, at 8-11. Hassol finds that “climate changes 
are being experienced particularly intensely in the Arctic. Artic average 
temperature has risen at almost twice the rate as the rest of the world in the past 
few decades.” Id. at 8.  
141 ARCTIC COUNCIL, Tromso Declaration (Apr. 29, 2009), available at 
http://library.arcticportal.org/1253/ 1/Tromsoe_Declaration-1.pdf. 
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substantially reducing global emissions of carbon dioxide.
142
  
The Declaration also emphasized the importance of adaptation in 
consultation with the indigenous peoples.
143
  
Dubner contends that there are two overlapping issues: the 
Arctic Ocean itself and the environment surrounding the Arctic 
Ocean. One proposal is to create a new jurisdictional boundary 
called an “Arctic Indicator” starting from the baselines of 
countries surrounding the Arctic.
144
 Within the indicator, the 
Arctic Ocean will be treated as a national refuge/park and there 
would be a moratorium on mineral development as, he argues, 
resort to the concept of sustainable yield does not solve the 
problem.
145
 The second proposal is to create “a legal regime that 
would have the sole responsibility of protecting the fragile 
environment surrounding the Arctic Ocean.”146  Although 
Dubner argues that the concept of a territorial sea is not needed 
in the Arctic Ocean,
147
 it is doubtful that Arctic states would be 
willing to give up their sovereignty, given the oil and gas 
reserves that are estimated to be available there.  Emphasizing 
that all states must share the responsibility of protecting the 
Arctic region, Dubner stresses that: 
 
A mineral moratorium in the Arctic Ocean is 
essential. Preventing pollutants from entering that 
area is essential. Protecting the lives of the 
indigenous people of the Arctic region is essential. 
Creating a legal regime that will be binding on the 
entire international community is essential.  Even for 
those cynics who argue that greed was the motivating 
factor of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the 
necessity for protecting these fragile areas can be 
seen. Even if greed was the essential ingredient, 
rather than the common heritage of mankind, greedy 
people would understand that allowing the 
                                                          
142 Id. at 1-2. 
143 Id. at 3. 
144 Dubner, supra note 104, at 21 
145 Id.. 
146 Id. 
147 Id (questioning whether the concept of a territorial sea is needed in 
any costal region). 
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degradation of the Arctic region to continue would 
only result in less natural resource production over 
time. It boils down to what one wants their 
grandchildren to have available to them in the 
future.
148
 
 
While there are many unknowns in relation to climate 
change and the Arctic, one thing is clear: climate change will 
cause unprecedented damage to the fragile nature of the Arctic 
and its people. International law, in turn, will have to deal with 
the unprecedented challenges posed to it by climate change and 
ensure that overlapping legal regimes at play work to protect the 
fragile environment and the vulnerable communities living there. 
                                                          
148 Id. at 22. 
